Risk analysis has become a priority for authorities and stakeholders in many European 13 countries, with the aim of reducing flooding risk by considering the priority and benefits of 14 possible interventions. Within this context, a model to estimate flood consequences was 15 developed in this study that is based on GIS, and integrated with a model that estimates the 16 degree of accessibility and operability of strategic emergency response structures in an 17 urban area. The majority of the currently available approaches do not properly analyze road 18 network connections and dependencies within systems, and as such a loss of roads could 19 cause significant damages and problems to emergency services in cases of flooding. The 20
related disasters killed more than 290,000 people, affected more than 1.5 billion people, and 1 inflicted more than US$ 422 billion in damage (United Nations World Water Assessment 2 Programme, 2009). In light of this, there has been increased emphasis on new policies for 3 increasing resilience to flooding (Djordjević et al., 2011) , 'preparing for floods' (ODPM,  4 2002), 'making space for water' (Defra, 2004 ) and 'living with risk' (UN/ISDR, 2004). This 5 emphasis reflects in part the perception that a risk management paradigm is more complex 6 than a more traditional standard-based approach as it involves 'whole systems' and 'whole 7 life' thinking. However, this is its main strength and a prerequisite for more integrated and 8 informed decision making in the face of flood emergencies (Sayers at al., 2013) . For example, 9 in the Netherlands, seeking to provide 'room for the river', scientists, policy-makers and 10 stakeholders have focused their attention on warning and evacuation systems, improvements 11 in maintenance standards, and a decision-making process that reflects greater attention to 12 economic efficiencies (Sayers at al., 2013) . Flood forecasting, warning, emergency 13 management and other non structural measures are increasingly being seen as critical for 14 reducing flood consequences. As part of this, there is a need to refine methods to estimate 15 flood risk and consequences, with particular attention on emergency management. does not take into account the dynamic nature of the urban system with its interconnections 24 and relationships among elements, and hence the performance of strategic structures and 25 infrastructure in case of emergency. Hence, indirect damages in the field of emergency 26 management, are not considered in these currently available consequence estimation models. 27
For example, the inaccessibility of inundated roads during emergency management activities 28 could cause indirect damage to the operability of strategic structures such as hospitals or fire 29
stations. 30
Other studies have dealt with specific aspects of emergency management, as well as 31 identification of safest access routes (Dalziell et al., 2001) , or evaluations of the number of 32 unassisted people (Taylor et al., 2006) . These studies have provided useful contributions tothe analysis of road accessibility (Franchlin et al., 2006) and reliability (Lhomme et al., 2013) ; 1 however, these studies did not consider emergency management of the whole system (i.e., 2 quantification of the contributions of each structure or infrastructure in the maintenance of the 3 performance of the rescue, and also its degree of vulnerability). On one hand, the latter papers 4 have not estimated the degree of physical damage of road networks and buildings due to 5 natural events. On the other hand, although these papers analyzed the accessibility and 6 operability of road networks, they did not consider their typology (e.g. main roads, local 7 roads, etc.) and the contribution of strategic structures (e.g. hospitals, civil protection centres, 8 etc.) and hotspots (industries, resorts and hotels) in the system. 9 Menoni et al. (2010) attempted to evaluate the systemic vulnerability of an urban system 10 by using a model to assess the vulnerability due to lifeline failures (i.e., road system, water 11 system, gas system, power system, etc.) for earthquake events. They proposed a regional scale 12 model that concentrates on the assessment of the large number of indirect damages to define 13 where to engage in more detailed studies on vulnerability analysis (i.e. the cities and towns 14 most affected by indirect damages evaluated through the model). This study highlighted the 15 need to quantify, through spatial analysis, the contribution of infrastructure (e.g., road 16 networks and structures (e.g., hospitals, industries, schools, etc.) in a city system to support 17 decision making regarding the type and location of the mitigation interventions. 
Data Acquisition and Harmonization 1
The level of uncertainty in estimating potential damage by the model depends on 2 available data (data collection, site visits, etc..). An analysis of the data considered land use 3 distribution, data population census, digital elevation terrain models, buildings and roads 4 categorized on the basis of the function/typology (e.g. main roads, local roads, industries, 5 resorts, hospitals, etc..). Therefore, both parts of the proposed approach require the 6 characterization of the system during the preliminary phases of the scheme in Fig. 1, i. e., 7 phase I: input Data Acquisition and Harmonization (data collection, site visits, etc..). 8
Definition of the Flood Scenario 9
The second phase, ("II Flood Scenario: hydrological analysis and flood scenario 10 evaluation"), is concerned with the definition of a flood scenario, or flood scenarios, required 11 to estimate the potential damages and/or in order to determinate the possible flood events. A 12 flood scenario can be identified by a return period, a combination of loads that determine a 13 failure scenario, the result of flood routing, etc. If the model runs several times for different 14 flood scenarios with different return times, the model can relate probabilities of each flood 15 event to potential consequences. 16 However, the evaluation of a flood scenario could be performed via a hydrological 17 analysis, which could be important to evaluate the probability of a scenario or of more 18 scenarios, coupled with a flood simulation, that should preferably be conducted using a Mississippi) that is likely to be data intensive but provides more detailed results in terms of 24 velocity and water depth distribution. The latter parameters are essential to estimate the flood 25 severity of the chosen scenario; flood severity is usually assigned using a flood depth 26 multiplied by average velocity value. 27
GIS Direct Impact Estimation 1
This phase of the methodology is composed of two parts and it provides two principal 2 results: the estimation of the loss of life and of the direct economic damages due the flood 3 event. 4 5
Population at Risk and Loss of Life estimation 6
During urban flooding events, consequences in terms of loss of life can be estimated 7 as the combination of population exposed to the flood, i.e. population at risk and fatality rates 8 (Escuder-Bueno at al., 2012) related to the characteristics of the flood, i.e. flood severity, 9 evaluated in phase II. Indeed, the results of flood modelling and the data from the population 10 census are used. Geographic analyses were carried out using Map Algebra techniques 11 implemented in a set of scripts tested and developed using the Python scripting language 12 (http://www.python.org/), the Open Sources GDAL libraries (http://www.gdal.org/), as well 13 as the NumPy Python module (http://www.numpy.org/). To combine multiple maps in Map 14 Algebra, all data were required to be converted into grid format. 15 The outputs of the hydrodynamic model, were processed to derive the information 16 If the information on population is aggregated at the census area level, it could be 4 hypothesized that it is distributed homogeneously within the vector polygon that represents 5 the census areas. Hence, the vector polygons of the population census block were converted 6 into grid format. By overlaying grid maps of flood with the grid of the population, it was 7 possible to develop a map of Population at Risk (PAR). 8
The estimate of loss of life was obtained by multiplying the PAR with the Fatality 9
Rate (fraction of people at risk projected to die from (severe) flood events). The fatality rates 10 proposed in the SUFRI project (Escuder-Bueno et al., 2012) were adopted in the model 11 because it is based on a literature study and procedures that cover the life-loss estimation of 12 historical flood events, (Graham, 1999) , and it has been applied with good results in Italy 13 
C3
-There is no public education on flood risk terms.
-There is EAP, but it has not been applied yet.
-Some coordination between emergency agencies and authorities (but protocols are not established). 
C4
-EAP is already applied.
-Coordination between emergency agencies and authorities (there are protocols). 
C5
-Coordination between emergency agencies and authorities (there are protocols).
-Communication mechanisms to the public (not checked yet). 
C6
-Communication mechanisms to the public. -EAP is already applied.
-Communication mechanisms to the public. The final step for life-loss estimation relies on the combination of fatality rates and population 1 at risk to obtain the number of potential fatalities for each flood scenario. Adopting a non-traditional approach, the adopted method measures the content damage 25 directly as a percentage of structure value rather than using a content-structure value ratio, i.e. 26 the ratio between the unitary value of the content and the unitary value of the building 27 structure. 28
To calculate damage, each structure must be assigned to a structure occupancy type. 29
For each structure occupancy type an estimated replacement value, a structure depth-damage 30 use other depth-damage curves that are more suitable for the area of interest; however, in the 2 present model the USACE curves were implemented since they were suitable with the case 3 study described in the next section, because they were also proposed in the 'SUFRI ' 4 Methodology (Escuder Bueno et. al, 2011) and are more precautionary that the one proposed 5
by Luino et al., (2003) for Italy. In assigning an occupancy type, taken usually from a city 6 map at micro-scale, to each parcel, we chose values according to those shown in Table 3 
GIS Accessibility and Operability Model for Emergency Management 1
This section describes how the infrastructural transport dependencies were estimated 2 in the urban area during the emergency phases of a flood event (i.e. the performance of rescue 3 activities taking into account the connections/paths between areas at risk and rescue centers 4 such as hospitals, fire stations, etc.). In terms of emergency management, the failure of some 5 part of the transport infrastructure would have the most serious effects on access to specific 6 locations and overall system performance. The road closures due to flood waters, estimated 7 on the basis of velocity and water depth values, could create damages and hence could alter 8 the emergency travel operations from normal conditions. In this context, an analysis of the 9 paths of the emergency travel activities could open the possibility to estimate the operability 10 of the strategic emergency structures and highlight weaknesses (e.g. the most inaccessible 11 area at risk or the strategic connectivity road that are most damaged). We focus on the 12 emergency operations, and not on the evacuation of the people that could have been done in 13 the pre-event phase of the flood event. 14 15
Road Closure Estimation 16
First, it is necessary to estimate road closures due to flood waters in order to estimate 17 the potential inaccessible areas and inoperable roads (phase IV of When the incoming flow depth is greater than the vehicle height, the roads are considered to 11 be always inaccessible. This choice is justified by the possible presence of emergency 12 vehicles that could work in worse conditions than cars (e.g. firefighter trucks, ambulances, 13 small boats, etc.). As such, the methodology, on the one hand, aims to give more importance 14 to closure of roads due to vehicle transport, which is a frequent phenomena in urban areas as 15 highlighted in Albano et al. (2014) , Gruntfest (2000) and Gruntfest and Ripps (2000) and, on the 16 other hand, aims to be precautionary and independent of the type of vehicles available in a 17 specific scenario in the analysis. 18
Accessibility and operability analysis of the urban system 1
Emergency management systems operate their vehicles in different ways during an 2 emergency such as a flood. For example, they might use local streets in order to take the 3 shortest path to their destination since the lower speed limit of local streets may not apply to 4 those emergency vehicles. As a result, the shortest path will provide them with the shortest 5 time distance. In this situation, a road closure due to a flood could alter the path that connects 6 different elements in an urban area, such as the path between a hospital and a damaged 7 school, thereby increasing the distance between them which would result in a lower level of 8 accessibility. Equation (1) 
where Ps is the length of the generic standard path, and Pe is the length of the 12 emergency path (i.e. the path that the aid vehicles have to travel due to the flood event). Ps max 13 is the value of the longest standard path between all the standard paths that connects the aid 14 centers with buildings at risk. A path is defined as "standard" if the latter connects aid centers 15 with buildings at risk in the normal functioning of system connections. These are defined as 16 "emergency" paths if the system is affected by a flood event. Equation (1) is an average of the 17 ratio Ps/Pe weighted on the ratio Ps max /Ps in order to consider the whole accessibility system, 18 (i.e. all the shortest paths among the elements at risk and all the emergency centers in the 19 system), normalized on the basis of all the relations "origins/destinations", hereafter "o/d", 20
where the origins are the core rescue buildings and the destinations are buildings at risk (i.e. 21 private or public buildings, factories, etc.). If an emergency path does not exist, (i.e., the 22 elements are completely isolated), a value of 0 is assigned to the ratio Ps/Pe. In this case, 23 access to alternative services (such as hospitals and businesses) does not exist. Therefore, the 24 disruption costs to households, businesses and communities can therefore be more critical for 25 the whole system. 26
The inverse reliability index, estimated by Eq. (1), highlights the travel distance 27 reliability of the path. Travel distance reliability considers the probability that a trip between 28 an origin-destination pair (see figure 5) can be completed successfully via the shortest 1 distance possible for the normal functioning of system connections, this is represented by the 2 blue line in Fig. 5 , and in the case of a flood event, this is represented by the red line in Fig. 5.  3 The ratio between Ps and Pe is weighted on the basis of the distance between "o/d" in order to 4 relate this ratio to the urban system network dependencies in the emergency phase; the 5 estimated value for each path is normalized on the basis of the multiple "o/d" relationship 6 because there can be more than one origin in the system (i.e. core rescue buildings). 7 Equation 1 is assigned to each shortest path and, therefore, to each arch a i that 8 composes the path, but it was used, see Eq. (2), also in order to estimate the degree of 9 inaccessibility of an area that requires rescue (i.e. the impedance index, introduced by Taylor 
The impedance index in Eq (2) is utilized to estimate the impedance of nodes (i.e. 14 buildings at risk), i.e. the remoteness derived from measures that aims to indentify the 15 buildings that are more difficult to reach by the emergency services. In Considering that each shortest path is composed of a number k of arches, an index to 5 estimate the strategic importance of single arches is estimated, and is known as the hierarchy 6 index. A network link is critical if loss or substantial degradation of the link significantly 7 diminishes the accessibility of the network or of particular nodes. Therefore, the arches that 8 are involved in a greater number of path connections (i.e. the ones that could be used more 9 often by aid vehicles to reach the flood prone areas) are the more important arches for 10 maintenance of the emergency management performance. 11
The hierarchy index, Hi, developed in this study represents the number of paths Ps that 12 connect the relations "o/d", using the arc a i : 13
where k ai is the count k of the times that the shortest paths Ps used the arch a i to connect the 14 multiple relations "o/d". alternative connections between arch a j and the others related to that being considered in theemergency phase, and, therefore, the number of available and non available arches, in case of 1 flooding, that could be utilized by emergency services, if the arc a j is inoperable. 2 Figure 7 shows an example of parameters involved in Eq. (4 ): the red line is the arc a i , 3
i.e. the arc to which will be assigned the value of inverse redundancy index; in blue outgoing 4 arcs a j from the arc a i that are inoperable due to the flood events, and in green the arcs a j from 5 the arc a i that are operable even in the case of a flood event. Therefore, the inverse 6 redundancy of arc a i in the system could be affected by the presence of more arcs a j that are 7 inoperable due to the flood events. It means that in the case of inoperability of arc a j , more 8 arcs a i are inoperable because the flood event will represent a slowing down in the 9 performance of emergency service that can use less alternatives to the arc a i during the 10 emergency rescue activities. 
where: x i is the weakness index of each of the elements previously described; a is a constant 7 which takes on a value equal to 2 and is calculated by fixing the boundary conditions (x i =0, The influence index takes into account the role of each element in the system in the 20 emergency phase. In this light, the components such as buildings or communication networks 21 were subdivided into categories A, B and C. These elements were divided in these categories 22 relative to the element functions in the systems in the case of an emergency. For instance, if a 23 hospital is damaged, the whole system is affected by an increase in the rescue workload for 24 other forms of assistance. The elements at risk with different roles and importance in the 25 emergency management are set in Categories A, B and C. The importance of these features 26 move from Category A to C in the following manner: 27
•Category A includes the most important elements in the case of an emergency, such as 1 hospitals, fire stations and civil protection stations. These are all elements that give assistance 2 when catastrophic events occur. This category also includes main roads. 3 
4
•Category B includes all the major socio-economic and environmental elements such as 5 factories, which can also deal with dangerous materials, large shopping centers, as well as all 6 other public buildings including universities, libraries and churches. All of these can contain a 7 large number of people and can be important from a historical, artistic and cultural 8
perspective. This category also includes secondary roads. 9
10
•Category C includes private buildings, small business activities, and local roads. 11 12
Maximum Impact estimation 13
Finally, the direct consequence estimation is coupled with the indirect systemic impact 14 in emergency management through a maximum impact index (i.e. phase V of Fig. 1 ). The 15 maximum impact of each element within the system is estimated by the equation: 16
where s i is the structural damage, estimated by depth-damage curves as described in the 17 previous subsection (phase III of potential maximum value of the summation of the direct and indirect impacts and theestimated impact value is lower than the ratio between the potential maximum value that 1 could be estimated with this methodology, i.e. value 1, and the maximum value, estimated by 2 this methodology, between the direct and indirect impact value, as previously described. 3 4
Case Study 5
Ginosa is a city in the Puglia region of Italy, located near the mouth of the Bradano 6
River. The choice of this case study site was justified by the flat morphological characteristics 7 of the river, determined using significant field data collected in recent years as well as the use 8 of high resolution DTM from laser-scan data. Moreover, the study area includes the mouth of 9 the Bradano River, which is particularly at risk for flooding. This estimation was derived 10 from an analysis of historical data on hydrogeological disasters between the period 1918 to intense, causing damage to economic activities and residential buildings, as well as provincial 22 and national roads which became unusable due to water and mud. The local administration is 23 still in the process of developing both structural and non structural measures to cope with 24 flood risk in Ginosa, as well as in the neighbouring towns. Regarding this study, it was 25 deemed preferable to validate the model proposed in this study with an event that has actually 26 occurred, rather than a generic simulated event. 27 28
Data 29

Characterization of the urban system of Ginosa
population data are taken from the Italian Institute of Statistics, which stores all the 2 demographical statistics, also in geographical form, for all of Italy ("Geo demo database at 3 demo.istat.it"). The population is aggregated at the census level scale. 4
The typical building topology is more than 90% 1-2 floor cottages (SIT Puglia 5 database, 2011). It should be noted that the ISTAT database and Puglia regional databases 6 were developed at different times, resulting in discrepancies between the data. The 7 discrepancies are related to the different times of the acquisition of the population data 8 (ISTAT, National Institute of Statistics, 2001 ) and the map of the city which represents 9 buildings and roads, at a scale of 1:5000 (SIT Puglia database, 2011). These discrepancies are 10 not believed to affect the final results of the model application. 11
The principal vulnerable hotspots in the Ginosa territorial system are the two most 12 important throughways. These include the "S.S. 106 Jonica Main Road", and the railway 13 "Taranto-Reggio Calabria". In addition, there is a first aid unit located in the part of the city 14 closer to the sea as well as diverse operative units that could support rescue activities. Due to the flat nature of the flooded zone, the flow velocity was average-low, and the 1 water depth high, in most of the zone (Figs. 8 and 9) . Hence, the direct economic damage 2 estimation was performed only on the basis of the water depth parameter. The total flood area 3 was determined to be approximately 30561900 m 2 (Table 4) . 4
The flood extension maps were able to define the areas of the territory directly 5 affected by the flood event, and incorporate the necessary hydraulic characteristics for the 6 study. Using GIS, flooded areas were identified to estimate the element at risk. Specifically, it 7 was found that less than 10% of the residential buildings are at risk because the more 8 populated area of the town is located outside the flooded area. However, 30% of business 9 activities are located in the flood prone area, in particular SMEs and resorts. In the flooded 10 area, 7% of the population are children or elderly people. The total loss of life estimated by the model corresponds to less than 1 fatality due to 1 the low population density of the area as well as the low percentage of people at risk. In the 2 event of March 1st 2011, there were no reported fatalities but substantial displacement of 3 populations and damage to infrastructure, farms and resorts, as highlighted in Table 5 (about 1000 buildings). It should be noted that it is not possible to complete a validation on 11 the other elements (i.e. roads, railways, agricultural areas) involved in the flood event due to a 12 lack of available data from the real event. However, it is possible to make a spatial 13 comparison with photos recorded at 10 observation points throughout the city (Figure 11-13-14 14), as was done in this study. 15 Figure 11 provides a comparison between the proposed model and several site surveys 16 during or after the events. It gives an overview of the consequences of the event and the 17 potential reliability of the model. The area in which damage potential is greatest and most 18 affected during the flood event is that closest to the river, where residential buildings and a 19 resort are located in "c/da Marinella". Meanwhile, the area on the far end of the riverbed (i.e. 20 "Via Ancona Road") received minimal damage (Fig. 11) . During the actual flood, the 21 majority of claims from damage associated with the natural disaster came from residents and 22
proprietors of factories and industries closest to the river. Indeed, one of the most damagedbuildings was the "Torre Sirena" resort, which resulted in one of the highest values of the 1 influence index because it has a high impedance index (Eq. 2 Sect. 2. 4 
.2). 2
The flood event of March 1st 2011 also caused serious damage to the main 3 infrastructural systems, as well as indirect damage to most of the surrounding area. Indeed, 4 the failure of some parts of the transport infrastructure would have the most serious effects on 5 access to specific locations and overall system performance. Based on the criteria described 6 earlier, the road closures are illustrated in Fig. 12 . This estimation allows for the identification 7 of potential inoperable road arches that could affect the whole system during the emergency 8 response activities. 9 Figure 13 outlines the potential fragility in connectivity between emergency centers 10 and the flooded area. 11 Figure 13 highlights the "S.S. 106" road has a medium value of the influence index 12 and this is justified by the important function that "S.S. 106" has in the system: this road is a 13 highway, i.e. a "Strada Statale" in accordance with the Italia Road Classification, and it is an 14 important connection between the operative centers located in the central part of the city and 15 the buildings at risk located in the area closer to the sea. Figure 13 also shows that the roads 16
closer to the first-aid centre, i.e. the element represented by the blue rectangle with the white 17 "H", is colored in orange and this means that they have a high value of influence index. This 18 is justified because this road has an elevated value of the hierarchy index (Eq. 3 in Sect. 19 Figure 14 highlights that the maximum impact estimation is important to identify 21 hotspots such as the main road, "S.S. 106", that is very important because it crosses through 22 the town, dividing it into two parts (e.g., Ginosa Marina located in front of the sea and Ginosa 23 town in the inland). The neighboring roads and the main street act as a connection between 24 the area at risk and the middle of the town and beaches. The zone located in 'c/da Marinella' 25 also had a high value for this index because it is almost completely isolated (Fig. 14) . 26
2.4.2). 20
The validations performed by comparisons with the case study illustrate the reliability 27 of the model, which allows for a satisfactory representation of the fragility of the territorial 28 system. It is possible that a similar conclusion could have been obtained simply through 29 expert advice due to the relative simplicity of the territorial system studied. However, the 30 results we show here can be viewed as important given the reliability of the model adopted 31 and the value of flood emergency management planning. 32
The proposed model outlined in this paper provides a quantitative estimate of flooding 1 consequences on the basis of direct impact estimation, i.e. structural and economic loss 2 estimation, and an estimation of areas prone to loss of life, taking into account the operability 3 of the strategic emergency structures, their accessibility, and connection within the urban area 4 during the emergency phase of a flood. The model can support emergency planning through the definition of a hierarchy 3 among the various structures and infrastructure by identifying those structures and 4 accessibility and connection with the urban system of a city in emergency phases. The 1 accessibility of an operability model, illustrated in the GIS model and integrated in the 2 consequence estimation model, help to define a hierarchy among the various structures and 3 infrastructure by identifying those structures and infrastructure whose operation and 4 efficiency are fundamental to the maintenance of network connectivity. In this way, the model 5 identifies the structures and infrastructures whose maintenance of performance, in terms of 6 connectivity or operability, could be essential in order to facilitate assistance to victims and 7 rescue activities, and could highlight the areas that need priority interventions. The latter 8 could be extremely useful in cases of limited financial resources. 9
The proposed model was piloted and validated in an urban area of the Puglia Region, 10 Southern Italy to demonstrate its operability for providing planners with a tool to identify the 11 hotspots in the urban system affected by floods and to aid in prioritizing interventions. 
